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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, 
a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LAURENCE CREASE and 
RE'ITA CREASE, his wife; 
RICHARD L. BEZZANT and 
ANGELINA BEZZANT, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 7874 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON AP:PEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by Pleasant Grove City, a mu-
nicipal corporation, to quiet the city's claimed title for street 
purposes to a strip of land running through a tract of land 
occupied by the defendants and appellants named above, 
together with various other parties (File 4-6) . 
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The Creases and Bezzants owned homes immediately 
adjoining the tract of land in question and each occupied a 
portion of the tract up to a common line in connection with 
their homes. They denied the title of Pleasant Grove City, 
and in counterclaims asserted title in themselves and alleged 
affirmatively that the city was estopped to question their 
titles (File 8-17). 
The district court, after hearing the evidence, ·concluded 
in a memorandum decision that the plaintiff "failed to es-
tablish its ownership of the lands in possession of the de-
fendants" and "the defendants failed to prove an estoppel 
as alleged in their counterclaims (File 21). 
The court made detailed findings of fact setting out the 
facts relating to this controversy, on the basis of which facts 
appellants contend that the court should have concluded as 
a matter of law that plaintiff was estopped from denying de-
fendants' titles and that the defendants as against plain-
tiff were the owners of the land in controversy (File 22-32). 
The court, nevertheless, concluded and decreed that while 
the plaintiff city was not entitled to judgment as against 
defendants, neither were the defendants entitled to judg-
ment against the plaintiff, and, therefore, entered a judg-
ment of "no cause of action" both on the complaint and on 
the counterclaims (File 33-34) . 
Upon the denial of motions for modification of judg-
ment and motion for new trial (File 37) defendants duly 
filed their notice of appeal (File 38), their designation of 
record on appeal (File 39-40), wherein the record formerly 
referred to as the Judgment Roll was specified, and their 
statement of points (File 41), whereby it was specified that 
the :court's conclusion of law No. 2 was erroneous in that it 
was not authorized nor supported by the findings, but that 
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the findings required the court to enter judgment for the 
defendants on their counterclaims quieting the respecti\7e 
titles for defendants as against the plaintiff; and that ··para-
graph No. 2 of the decree was erroneous in that it was not 
justified by the findings and that the court should have ad-
judged and decreed that defendants' respective titles be qui-
eted as against plaintiff as prayed for in the coWlterclaims; 
and t hat the court erred in refusing to modify the conclu-
sions of law and judgment in accordance with the defend-
ants' motion. 
Thereafter, plaintiff also filed an abortive appeal (File 
46) but designated substantially the same record as defend-
ants had done on their appeal, neither including the tran-
script. This attempted appeal by plaintiff was dismissed· 
by this Court upon defendants' motion, and the appeal is now 
from that part of the decree denying defendants relief on 
their counterclaims and the matter is before the ·Court on 
the File which prior to the adoption of .URCP was referred 
to as the Judgment Roll. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The determinative facts in this case can be perhaps 
best and most concisely set out in the words of the trial 
court's findings themselves. First, however, it may be-help-
ful to this Court to explain the general location of the land 
in dispute ~th reference to other propert,y of defendants 
and the established streets of Pleasant Grove City. 
The property of the defendants, Laurence Crease, et ux 
and Richard L. Bezzant, et ux, hereinafter mentioned as 
parts of Lot 5, Block 8, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove City Sur-
vey, and Lot 2, Block 7, t>lat "A", Pleasant Grove City Sur-
vey, owned by said parties respectively, face on Third South 
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Street, formerly designated as Second South Street, and 
the west and east lines of their respective parcels of land 
join the said disputed area four rods- wide; the Creases 
Creases claiming the east two rods thereof and the Bezzants, 
the west two rods thereof. Fourth East Street of said Plea& 
ant Grove City joins the said Third South Street immedi-
ately north of said disputed area. The Crease home is lo-
cated a few feet east of the east line of said disputed area 
and the Bezzant home is located a few feet west of the west 
line of the said disputed area. There never has been a street 
or other passageway over or across the disputed area and 
the disputed area, as far back as the records go, has been 
treated by defendants and their predecessors in interest as 
their private property without any objection on the part 
of the city until shortly before the commencement of the 
present action. 
Omitting the formal findings as to identity, corporate 
existence, etc.-, we now set out the findings of the· court 
(File 22-32) : 
"4. That one W. G. Sterrett was a resident of Pleas-
ant Grove City, Utah Te·rritory, some years prior to the 
year 1869; but as to the number of years the evidence 
does not show; and that said Sterrett was in posses-
sion of and claimed the title to what was designated 
as Lot 5, Block 8; Lot 2, Block 7, Plat ''A", Pleasant 
Grove City, and of the 4 rods of land located between 
said lots embracing the area now in dispute, and he was 
also in possession of and claimed title to Lot 2, Block 
14, Plat "A", of said Pleasant Grove City, and that the 
same was enclosed by a substantial fence. 
"5. That sometime prior to June 26, /1869, the exact 
time· the evidence does not show, said W. G. Sterrett 
. sold and transferred the possession of the said lots to-
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5 
gether with said parcel of land now in dispute in this 
action, and also Lot 2, Block 14 located immediately 
north of said Lot 5, Block 8, and all of the right and 
title that the said W. G. Sterrett had thereto to Daniel 
M. Smith, then a resident of said Pleasant Grove City, 
Utah, and the said Daniel M. Smith was legally in the 
possession of the said lots above mentioned on the 26th 
day of Jtme, 1869, and was the owner of the right to 
the said parcels of land and to the possession thereof 
on the 26th day of June, 1869, on which date there was 
an entry made by John Brown, then Mayor of Pleas-
ant Grove City, Utah, known as Cash Entry No. 297, 
covering the SE~~~ of Section 20, SW1,4 of Section 21, 
NW14 of Section 28 and NE:J4 of Section 29, Township 
6 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in trust, 
ho\vever, for the inhabitants of said city, and especially 
said residents lawfully in the possession of the said 
lands .. 
"6. That at the time of the entry made by said John 
Brown, Mayor, as above stated, all of the said lots and 
·of the intervening area between said lots were enclosed 
in one field or area with nothing to indicate by any 
visual inspection but that the entire area was part and 
parcel of the said lots. 
"7. That at said times hereinabove mentioned no 
streets had been surveyed or in any way marked indi-
cating the location of any streets over such interven-
ing area between the said lots or across any of said 
area; that First East Street, as then designated, now 
Fourth East Street, had not been surveyed or opened 
until more than five years after the John Brown entry 
No. 297 as above set out; that at the date of said entry, 
Second South Street, as then designated or named, and 
now at the time of the trial designated as Third South 
Street, had not been surveyed or opened and was not 
opened until more than five year thereafter, and when 
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opened the area covered by Second South Street ad-
joining Daniel M. Smith's property was recognized as 
being his property by the city officials of said Pleasant 
Grove City and the same was purchased from the said 
Daniel M. Smith by Pleasant Grove City and paid for 
out of the City Treasury; the same situation was true 
of the area covered by First East Street running north 
from the said Daniel M. Smith's property, now named 
Fourth East Street, and the area now embracing said 
Fourth East Street of Pleasant Grove City was recog-
nized as belonging to various occupants of the same 
and the said area was either taken by condemnation 
proceedings as provided by the charter of said city and 
paid for out of the City Treasury, or was purchased 
and paid for by said City without condemnation pro-
ceedings, payment therefor being made from the City 
Treasury; that the area, during all the times above 
mentioned, between Lot 5, Block 8 and Lot 2, Block 7 
now claimed by plaintiff herein in this action lies im-
mediately south of Second South Street (now Third 
South Street) opened and paid for by plaintiff city and 
the same area is immediately south of said First East 
Street (now Fourth East Street), and during all of 
these proceedings culminating in the opening of said 
First East Street and Second South Street, and par-
ticularly all of the area now claimed by the plaintiff as 
against these answering defendants, was in the posses-
sion of said Daniel M. Smith as a part and portion of 
his enclosed area, and was claimed by him and recog-
nized by Pleasant Grove City as his property. 
''8. That during said period prior to 1869, and at the 
times said adjoining streets were opened by Pleasant 
Grove City and the land paid for by said ·city, Daniel 
M. Smith was growing an orchard on part of this now 
disputed area. He erected immediately east of the east 
line of the property now in dispute a substantial home 
in whieh he and his family lived and as part of the en-
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closure above mentioned, and he had erected upon a 
portion of the now disputed area corals, chicken coops, 
machine sheds and maintained a substantial building 
used as a granary immediately east of what is now 
claimed as part of the disputed area; he erected and 
n1aintained for many years a blacksmith shop on said 
no\v disputed area; he had also erected directly east of 
the said disputed area in such enclosure a large hay 
barn and it was used in connection with the enclosed 
area. 
"9. That although Third South Street prior to the op-
ening of said Second South Street immediately south 
of the Daniel M. Smith holdings had been surveyed and 
staked, the same has never to the present time been 
opened or the area comprising said street has never 
been claimed by Pleasant Grove ·City. 
"10. That shortly after said Daniel M. Smith came 
into the ownership and possession of said Lot 5, Block 
8 and Lot 2, Block 7 and after the opening of said Sec-
ond South Street (now Third South Street), said Dan-
iel M. Smith planted hardwood trees all along the south 
side of said Lot 5, Block; Lot 2, Block 7 and the now· 
disputed area, and that all of said trees through the 
years have developed into very large trees apparently 
75 to 80 years old, four of which are immediately along 
the north side of said disputed area. 
"11. That said Daniel M. Smith continued to cultivate 
a portion of said now disputed area and the orchard 
growing thereon, and theretofore planted by him and 
covering a portion of said area, and he maintained the 
other improvements upon said area as above set out; 
and at all times in good faith claimed the same as his 
property until in the year 1884 he ·Conveyed the said 
lots 5 and 2 to his wife, Emma Smith, including the 
home located thereon and in which she and her family 
lived, and she took possession thereof including the now 
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disputed area and used and cultivated the same as 
theretofore and maintained the exclusive possession 
thereof until her death in 1914; and that she and her 
predecessors in interest in good faith maintained their 
possession of said property, claimed the same as their 
own, and without any claim to the possession or right 
to the possession of the disputed area by Pleasant 
Grove City or any of its officials and without any 
knowledge that there was ever any claim made by them 
to the now disputed area. 
"12. That during all of the time up to the death of 
said Emma Smith, also known as Emma H. Smith, the 
disputed area formed a part of the enclosure covering 
Lots 5 and 2 above mentioned and from any visual in-
spection of the entire enclosure there was nothing to 
indicate but that the entire now disputed area formed 
a part of said Lots 5 and 2 as hereinabove mentioned 
''13. That upon the death of said Emma Smith, also 
known as Emma H. Smith, her estate was probated in 
the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Utah, and 
in the course of the probate proceedings the entire es-
tate was partitioned and distributed to her heirs at 
law (7 in number) and the said Lots 5 and 2 above 
mentioned, including the now disputed area, were par-
titioned and distributed as above stated and a decree 
of distribution was duly made and entered in the mat-
ter of the estate of Emma H. Smith, deceased, and re-
corded in the records of the court dated the 3rd day 
of July, 1916, in Book 98, Page 515 of the records of 
· Utah County, State of Utah; and as a part thereof there 
was partitioned and decreed to Burdett Smith, one of 
the heirs at law, the following described parcel of prop-
erty including the east one-half of the area now in dis-
pute, to-wit: 
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 5 in 
Block 8, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove City Survey; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
thence East 10 rods 6 feet; thence South 29 rods; 
thence West 12 rods 6 feet; thence North 28 rods 
14% feet; thence East 2 rods to place of beginning. 
Also 3 acres of Pleasant Grove Irrigation Company 
Water. 
That as a part of said decree of distribution there was 
partitioned and decreed to Earl C. Smith, one of the 
heirs at law of the said ~mma H. Smith, the following 
described parcel of land and including the west one-
half of said now disputed area, to-wit: 
Commenciilg at the Northeast comer of Lot 2 in 
Block 7, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove ·city Survey; 
thence East 2 rods; thence South 14 rods 11 feet; 
t hence West 41 rods; thence North 7 ·rods 11 feet; 
thence East 10 rods; thence North 7 rods; thence 
East 29 rods to the place of beginning. Also 5% 
acres of Pleasant Grove Irrigation water. · 
''14. That the said parcels of land partitioned and de-
creed to Burdett Smith and Earl C. Smith were, com-
mencing in the year 1917, assessed to the respective par-
ties above named and their successors in interest up 
to and including the year 1951· and the taxes were paid 
to ·Utah County for the benefit of the State of Utah, 
Utah County· and Pleasant Grove City, and the de-
scriptions thereof have appeared upon the records of 
Utah County as decreed and described as above men-
tioned ever since. 
"15. That on March 24, 1917, Burdett Smith and his 
wife mortgaged to Thatcher Brothers Banking Com-
pany the above property as· described in said decree of 
distribution for $500.00, which mortgage was larter 
paid and the same released of record; that on Febru-
ary 9, 1920,·Burdett Smith and his wife, Lottie F. Smith 
conveyed by warranty deed to Edward R. Nelson said 
property conveyed by said decree of distribution to said 
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Burdett Smith, and received a mortgage back from Ed-
... ward R. Nelson and wife for $1000 which mortgage was 
later assigned to Louis W. Lund; that on March 10, 
1926 said property was sold to Utah County ·for delin-
quent taxes and the same not being paid, an auditor's 
tax deed was issued to Utah County covering rthe above 
described property dated March 15,.1930; that on Oc-
tober 3, 1930, Utah County resold to Edward R. Nelson 
by quit claim deed the said property; that the Edward 
R. Nelson mortgage to Burdett Smith was assigned but 
finally paid and released on December 29, 1933; that 
.. on March 6, 1934, said real estate deeded to Edward 
R~ Nelson and his wife was mortgaged, not being paid 
the same was foreclosed and the same sold to Home 
Owners Loan Corporation, and sheriff's deed issued to 
said Home Owners' Loan Corporation dated October 
14, 1939 and recorded in Book 348, Page 434 of the rec-
ords of Utah County; that on March 8, 1944, said par-
cel of land as first hereinabove described was sold and 
conveyed to Lawrence Crease, also known as Laurence 
Crease, and Retta S. Crease, husband and wife, as joint 
tenants, by warranty deed recorded in Book 400, Page 
584 records of Utah County, Utah. 
"16. That said Laurence Crease and Retta S. Crease 
purchased and paid for said property in good faith and 
without any knowledge from any visual inspection or 
otherwise that Pleasant Grove City had or claimed any 
interest for street purposes or otherwise in said prop-
erty. 
"17. That since purchasing said property. said Lau-
rence Crease ~and his wife, Retta S. Crease, have paid 
substantial sums of money for remodeling the home 
located adjacent to the disputed area, by building a 
cesspool upon said area and in moving the said bam 
above mentioned from where it was located on said Lot 
5, Block 8 onto said disputed area, and by. making oth-
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er improvements in and about said disputed area at a 
cost of approximately $3,000.00, in good faith, without 
any knowledge or information whatever that Pleasant 
Grove City claimed any interest or right to said prop-
erty and ,that the title thereto was in any way clouded 
by any claim of Pleasant Grove City until shortly be-
fore this action was commenced in 1950. 
"18. That if said street should now be opened as prn-
posed by Pleasant Grove City, irt would cause the home 
of said defendants to be greatly depreciated in value, 
the granary would be of no value and the property ad-
joining said disputed area could be damaged to the ex-
tent of several thousand dollars and would be made un-
suitable for residential purposes. 
"19. The court further finds as to the property con-
veyed and partitioned to Earl C. Smith by the decree 
of distribution in the matter of the estate of Emma H. 
Smith, deceased, that in the year 1921 said property 
was sold for taxes in the name of Earl Smith and was 
later advertised for sale as described in said decree of 
distribution, and the taxes not being paid was sold to 
Utah County, January 3rd, 1921, and the taxes not 
thereafter being paid an auditor's tax deed was issued 
to Utah County, State of Utah, on March 23, 1923; that 
later Utah County by quit claim deed sold and con-
veyed said property to Eldores Smith and Benarr 
Smith; that later Eldores Smith and Benarr Smith con-
veyed the same property to Earl Smith by quit claim 
deed; that February 26, 1921, Earl Smith signed and 
recorded the Declaration of Homestead on the said 
property decreed to him as hereinabove stated; that on 
August 28, 1916, E·arl C. Smith and Lizzie M. Smith, 
his wife, mortgaged said property to the Bank of Pleas-
ant Grove for $500.00; on March 18, 1922, Earl C. 
Smith, a widower, mortgaged said property to the Bank 
of Pleasant Grove for $873.70; on December 28, 1825, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
said property was sold to Utah County after being ad .. 
vertiseo for sale and was later redeemed; on March 15, 
1930, the above described property was sold to Utah 
County for delinquent taxes after being advertised for 
tax deed was issued to Utah County recorded in Book 
305, Page 526 on March 15, 1936; on March 15, 1937, 
the E·arl C. Smith property was sold by Earl Smith, also 
sometimes known as Earl C. Smith, to Eldores R. Smith 
and Benarr Smith as recorded in Book 348, Page 221 of 
the records of Utah County; on April 30, 1941, Utah 
County conveyed by quit claim deed the property de-
creed to Earl C. Smith to Paul A. Adamson; on May 1, 
1945, Paul A. Adamson and wife sold and conveyed a 
portion of said property to E. Earl Walker and Thorban 
Jacob Walker by warranty deed and including the west 
two rods of the area now claimed by the plaintiff in this 
action; that on July 21, 1947, said E. Earl Walker and 
Thorban Jacob Walker, his wife, sold and conveyed by 
warranty deed the said property to Richard L. Bez-
zant and Angelina F. Bezzant, defendants herein, as 
joint tenants, including the west two rods of property 
now claimed by the plaintiff,·Pleasant Grove City; that 
shortly after Richard L. Bezzant and Angelina F. Bez-
zant purchased the property hereinabove mentioned 
from E. Earl Walker, said defendants in good faith and 
Without any knowledge of any ·claim of Pleasant Grove 
City, and relying upon their title to said property as 
shown by their abstract of title, applied to the build-
ing inspector of Pleasant Grove City for a permit to 
build a home on said property purchased and they made 
plans for the building of a modern home on said prop-
erty locating said home near the west side of the prop-
erty now claimed by Pleasant Grove City for street 
purposes; and said defendants, relying upon their title 
and in accordance with the permit from the building 
inspector, began the construction of said home and ex-
pended approximately $2,000 in excavating therefor, 
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and the erection of, a foundation for said home, and 
then shortly thereafter applied for and obtained a mort-
gage loan on said home and property in order to com-
plete the same from the State Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation, a corporation, for the swn of $6500, and that 
this \Vas done in full reliance upon the title to said prop-
erty purchased and without any knowledge that Pleas-
ant Grove City made any claim of right or title to any 
portion of said property. 
''20. The evidence further shows that said Richard 
L. Bezzant and his Wife would not have purchased said 
property or planned and erected their home thereon 
had they had any notice or knowledge that the city 
made any claim to any of said property now claimed 
by it in this action, and that if Pleasant Grove City 
should utilize the property claimed by it herein for 
street purposes, the said Richard L. Bezzant and his 
wife would suffer substantial damage and the value of 
their home would be greatly depreciated. 
"21. That for more than 80 years prior to the com-
mencement of this action, the defendants, Laurence 
Crease and Retta S. Crease, his wife, and Richard L. 
Bezzant and Angelina F. Bezzant, his wife, and their 
predecessors in interest and the predecessors of each 
of them have had the open, notorious and exclusive 
possession of said parcel of land now in dispute and 
claimed by the plaintiff with knowledge and acqui-
escence of the plaintiff and its officers; and they have 
used the same for residential, business and agricultural 
purposes as hereinbefore found and without any knowl-
edge or notice from the city of Pleasant Grove or the 
officers thereof during all of that time and no such 
claim was ever made by it or them until shortly before 
this action was commenced in 1950." 
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POINTS RELIED ON 
Although in our statement of points filed before the 
District Court and in our Statement of the Case above re-
ferred to, we stated the proposition under three head-
ings, there is really only one point, and that is that the 
findings authorized and required the court to enter judg-
ment for defendants on their counterclaims quieting the 
respective titles of defendants as against plaintiff and that 
the court should have adjudged and decreed that defend-
ants' titles be quieted as against plaintiff. 
m further elaboration of this point, it is specifically 
contended that conclusion of law No. 2 and paragraph No. 
2 of the decree both determining that judgment of ''no cause 
of action" should be entered on defendants' counterclaims, 
are erroneous and that the court erred in refusing to modi-
fy its conclusion and decree in order to quiet defendants' 
titles as against plaintiff for the reasons: 
I. That defendants being in possession and it having 
been determined that the plaintiff had no right, title or in-
terest in the property, the defendants' titles. should have 
been quieted as against plaintiff. 
II. The findings of fact show that defendants are the 
owners of the land in controversy and a decree should have 
been entered accordingly. 
III. The findings of fact show as a matter of law that 
the plaintiff should be, and is, estopped from questioning 
defendants' title. 
These points . will be considered in the following argu-
ment in order. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The defendants being in possession and it having 
been determined that the· plaintiff had no right, title or in-
terest in the property, the defendants' titles should have 
been quited as against plaintiff. 
The court determined that the evidence failed to show 
that Pleasant Grove City had any right to the possession 
of. or title to, the area in dispute (File 23, Finding 3). 
The findings further show that ever since prior to 1869 
the defendants and their predecessors in interest have, and 
no\v have, the open, notorious and exclusive possession of 
the land with the knowledge and acquiescence of the plain-
tiff and its officers and that they have used the same for 
residential, business and agricultural purposes during all 
of said period without any claim ever being made by such 
city or its officers until shortly before this action was com-
menced ( (File 32) . 
The record being undisputed, and the effect of the 
court's decree being to finally determine, that the city had 
no right, title or interest in, and to, the property in ques-
tion, and a judgment of no cause of action having been en-
tered on its complaint therefor, the court should not have 
left the title as between the parties dangling in the air, but 
should have quieted defendants' titles as against the plain-
tiff. As between a party in possession and one having no 
title, the court should quiet the title of the party in posses-
sion. Pender v. Bird, Utah , 224 P.2d 1057. 
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n. Tile findings of fact show that defendants are the 
legal owners of the land in controversy and a decree should 
have been entered accordingly. 
The right of the defendants to have their title quieted 
as against plaintiff under the doctrine discussed in Point I 
above is not dependent upon legal title; nor is the right of 
defendants under the doctrine of estoppel which we will dis-
cuss under Point III dependent upon legal title. However, 
·we wish to now point out that the findings require the con-
clusion that the defendants are the owners by reason of ad-
verse possession initiated by their predecessors prior to en-
try by the city. The facts as found by the court entitled the 
defendants to the judgment of the trial court quieting in 
them the title to their respective parcels of the disputed area 
by reason of adverse possession held by them and their pre-
decesors in interest from a time prior to the entry of said 
land by the Mayor of Pleasant ·Grove City under the town .. 
site law, which entry was made on June 26th, 1869. 
True, it is generally held, though there is a division 
of authority, that adverse possession does not run against 
a city with respect to its streets. 1 Am. Jur. "Adverse Pos-
session", Sec. 106, pp. 850-852. It is even more clear that 
where adverse possession has extended for the statutory 
period before title to the highway was attempted to be ac-
quired by the municipality, title thereby vested in the ad-
verse occupant may be sustained as against the munici-
pality. (Ibid). 
The fair intendment of the findings may be that this 
case comes under the latter rule, but a more interesting 
question is presented ifi as appears possible, the record 
me~ely sho:ws herein that the adverse possession was initi-
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ated several years prior to the entry hy the city, without 
any affirmative showing that this prior period amounted 
to seven years. but with the showing that after the town .. 
site entry such adverse possession continued uninterrupted 
for far beyond the statutory period of seven years. 
In such case, we contend that adverse possession thus 
initiated prior to entry by the city, the other elements be-
ing present, matures into a complete right and is not in-
terrupted by the attempted entry by the city. Upon the 
occupancy of the claimant prior to entry, he became the 
equitable owner of the land, against which the attempted 
entry was not effective in view of the continued adverse 
possession. Granted that one might not be able as against 
a right on the part of the city to initiate adverse possesion, . 
such possession once initiated, we submit, was not inter-
rupted by subsequent entry by the city. 
Not directly in point, but analogous, is the situation of 
an adverse claimant to land whose possession is ·character-
ized by its initiation as hostile, adverse and open, and who 
subsequently acquires the status of a fiduciary. Unless 
there is an actual breach of trust, the subsequent fiduciary 
relationship should not prevent the running of the statute, 
although the adverse period could not have been initiated 
during the fiduciary relationship. The point as applied to 
adverse possession against the city has been at least im-
pliedly passed upon by this Court favovable to our con-
tention in the cases of West v. 'Child, 8 Utah 223, 30 Pac. 
755, and West, et al v. Utah National Bank, et al, 8 Utah 
37 4, 31 Pac. 987. 
In the first case, it was held that under 14 U. S. Stat. 
at Large, rp. 541, providing that public land occupied as a 
townsite, in case the town is incorporated, may be entered 
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by the corporate authorities in trust for the occupants there-
o,f according to their respective interests, an occupant be-
fore such entry has an inchoate right to the benefit of the 
law, which descends to his widow and children but which 
they lose by failing to retain possession until the entry is 
made. The action was against other claimants under the 
townsite entry by Mayor of Ogden City. The complaint 
of the successors to those originally in possession prior to 
the entry was held not to state a cause of action, on the 
ground there was no allegation that the possession of the 
original claimant had been mainained. We quote the con-
clusion of this opinion after the case of Stringfellow v. Cain, 
99 U. S. 610, is referred to therein: 
"The Court held that as to such portions of the 
lot as had been sold by the widow or by the adminis-
trator, or to which she had yielded the possession to 
another, the rights of herself and children had gone, 
and she and her children were only entitled to such 
portion of the lot as was possessed or occupied by them 
when entry of the land was made. The widow and 
children of West inherited from him his right to tne 
adverse possession of the property in controversy, but 
not of the title thereto, there being no averment that 
the land had been entered before his death. But there 
being no allegation in the complaint that they continued 
the possession begun by him in his lifetime until the 
entry was made, we think the complaint fails to state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that 
the demurrer was rightfully sustained on that ground. 
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other questions 
argued by counsel. The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.'' 
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In West, et al v. Utah National Bank, et al, supra, this 
Court again sustained a demurrer to a similar complaint 
ori the grotmd that it was not alleged that the administrators. 
or the heirs \Vere in possession of the land at the time of its 
entry by the Mayor of Ogden City under the townsite entry 
law. The Court added: ''Without such an ·allegation, the 
complaint did not state a cause of action." The clear im-
plication of both of these opinions is that with such an alle-
gation and proof, adverse possession would run, or at least 
title would be established in favor of the original occupant 
who had maintained adverse possession after the entry by 
the Mayor of the City. 
In the case at Bar, it is expressly found that the posses-
sion by the predecessors in interest of the defendants ante-
dated the townsite entry and that such adverse possession 
has been maintained ever since the original entry. 
Finding No. 4, p. 23 of the File finds that some years 
prior to the year 1869, but as to the number of years the 
evidence does not show, Sterrett was in possession of, and 
claimed, the title to the land in controversy. Finding No. 
3 shows that prior to June 26th, 1869, Sterrett sold and trans-
ferred such land to Daniel M. Smith and that said Smith 
was in possession of such land on the 26th day of June, 1869, 
on which date there was an entry made by John Brown, 
then Mayor of Pleasant Grove City, Utah. It is further 
found that at the time of such entry and ever since there 
were no streets and the area was enclosed in private fence 
lines (File 24-25) and was used as orchard and for purposes 
in connection with farm and home by Smith and his suc-
cessors (File 25-26) and that the property has been used, 
mortgaged and sold in the chain of title by defendants and 
their predecessors as private property (File 27 -31) ; in short, 
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for more than 80 years prior to the commencement of this 
action, as found by the court, the defendants and their pre-
decessors in interest had had the open, notorious and ex-
clusive possession of said parcels of land in disptue. Under 
such circumstances there seems no reason why defendant 
should not be declared to hold legal title, since even the 
townsite entry has the effect of reserving the land in trust 
for the inhabitants entitled thereto and since by reason 
of the original occupation prior to the townsite entry and 
maintenance of adverse possession ever since the predeces-
sors of the defendants, and the defendants have established 
and maintained their rights. 
Ill. The findings of fact show that the plaintiff should 
be and is estopped from questioning defendants' title. 
Irrespective of what the Court may determine on the 
two preceding points, it seems clear that the same conclu-
sion must be reached because the city under all of the facts 
and circumstances is estopped from questioning the title of 
these defendants. The facts furnishing the basis of this 
estoppel are found in detail by the court. We think it com-
mendable on its part that, while not agreeing with appel-
lants as to the conclusion to be drawn, it did at least find 
fully the facts established by the evidence so that this ques-
tion dividing the parties could readily be determined upon 
a review here. 
As a matter of history, of which the Court may take 
judicial notice, the lands settled upon and later included 
within Pleasant Grove townsite entry were occupied from 
an early date, perhaps about 1849. Pleasant Grove City 
was incorporated in January, 1855, by an act of the Gov-
ernor and legislative assembly of Utah Territory. At that 
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time and until June 26th, 1869, the same was a part of the 
public lands of the United States. The said townsite entry 
\Yas made by John Brown as Mayor of Pleasant Grove City 
on June 26th, 1869. As a matter of historical and con1mon 
knowledge, these public lands were taken into possession 
by the early settlers by building homes thereon, by fencing 
the same, or by the cultivation thereof. 
The findings in this case show that W. G. Sterrett was 
one of the early settlers of this Pleasant Grove area and later 
Pleasant Grove townsite entry, and that before June 26th, 
1869, and at least several years theretofore, he was in pos-
session of what was later designated as Lot 5, Block 8; Lot 
2, Block 7; and Lot 2, Block 14, Plat "A", Pleasant Grove 
City Survey and including also the area in dispute between 
said lots. 
The record further discloses that W. G. Sterrett, as such 
occupant of the above mentioned lots and of the area be-
tween the same, later transferred his rights as above men-
tioned to Daniel M. Smith, sometime prior to the time that 
John Brown made the said townsite, but as to how long 
before, the record does not definitely show. It does show 
that said Smith was in possession and was the occupant of 
said lots and area herein last above mentioned at the time 
of said entry on June 26th, 1869, and that the same had 
been transferred to him by said W. G. Sterrett and that 
said lands, including the area now in dispute, were enclosed 
together with nothing to indicate the presence of any street 
whatever as far as any marks or indication upon the ground 
were concerned and .that ever since the land in dispute has 
been used and claimed hy the defendants and valuable rights 
predicated thereon. 
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The parc-el of land now claimed by Pleasant Grove be-
t,veen said Lot 5, Block 8 and Lot 2, Block 7, has continued 
to be in the exclusive possession of, and under claim of own-
ership, and within substantial enclosure by, the defendants 
herein and their predecessors in interest ever since shortly 
after its first settlement and long before the same was en-
tered by Mayor John Brown, with every appearance upon 
the ground, of ownership and ex~clusive possession in con-
nection with said Lot 5, Block 8 and Lot 2, Block 7. 
The record shows that Pleasant Grove City has never 
had nor claimed the ownership or the possession of said land 
now in dispute until shortly before the commencement of 
this action. During all of said time, and c.ommencing prior 
to the entry of the townsite, said parcel of land in question 
has been enclosed by a substantial fence and by gates lead-
ing into such enclosure and used only for the convenience 
of the occupants; that during practically all of said period, 
portions of the said disputed area have been farmed and cul-
tivated as a part of the larger tract and an orchard has been 
grown on a portion thereof and treated by defendants and 
their predecessors in interest from the beginning as a part 
and parcel of the said lots and handled in all respects as a 
portion thereof. 
A home, granary and a barn were built on said Lot 5, 
Block 8, adjacent to said disputed area in such a position 
as would necessarily be considered undesirable had any 
street been contemplated on said disputed area, nothing be-
ing apparent upon said Lot 5 or the now disputed area to 
differentiate one parcel from the other. 
The disputed area, for other purposes entirely incon-
sistent with the use of it ·as a street, was utilized by the vari-
ous occupants of the same. From the earliest time within 
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the memories of the oldest residents of Pleasant Grove· City, 
corrals, pigsties, chicken coops, a blacksmith shop, machin-
ery sheds or buildings were constructed and maintained on 
the disputed area; and such use of the area has continued 
-- until the present time, and all this without any complaint, 
objection or notice of any claims from the plaintiff city un-
til shortly before the commencement of this action. There 
was nothing through all these years to indicate that the dis-
puted area was held by the defendants and their predeces· 
sors in any different capacity than was Lot 5, Block 8 and 
Lot 2, Block 7. 
In the year 1934, the parcel of land now O\.Vlled and 
claimed by the defendants, Laurence ,C'rease and wife, was 
mortgaged to Home Owners' Loan Corporation, a corpora-
tion, and later said mortgage was foreclosed and the prop-
erty sold at public auction to the Blome Owners' Loan Cor-
poration and a sheriff's deed issued to the Home Owners' 
Loan Corporation and the same was later, or in about 1939, 
sold under contract to Laurence Crease and his wife, and 
later by warranty dee~ dated March 8th, 1944 and recor-
ded on March 22nd, 1944, all of which is shown by the evi-
dence in this case and the exhibits above referred to. 
The findings further show that said Crease and his wife 
would not have purchased the said property had they known 
or any claimed street, as now contended for by plaintiff city 
and if said city should now be permitted, under the above 
circumstances, to take said property as attempted by this 
action, said defendants would suffer great and irreparaJble 
injury. 
What is said about Lot 5, Block 8 and the two rods 
a~j~i~g the same on the west thereof, is also true of Lot 
2, Block 7 and the two rods of ground adjoining the same 
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on the east side thereof now claimed by Richard L. Bezzant 
and wife-they purchased said property in good faith with-
out any knowledge of any claim of Pleasant Grove City or 
that there was any street as now claimed by said city cov-
ering a portion of the land deeded to them. In reliance upon 
their ownership of the land which was deeded to them by 
warranty deed on July 21st, 1947, as shown by page 35 in 
exhibit 6, almost immediately after such purchase, the said 
d~fendants commenced the construction of a new home ad-
jacent to the east side of said parcel thus purchased and 
under a permit from Pleasant Grove City. 
To complete said home, they mortgaged the same and 
the parcel of land deeded to them as hereinbefore stated to 
State Savings and Loan Association, a corporation, for the 
swn of $6,500 which mortgage was recorded in the records 
of Utah County, State of Utah on June 23rd, 1949. The 
record shows that the said defendants, Richard L. Bezzant 
and his wife, had they known of any claim of Pleasant Grove 
City that a public street covered a portion of the land pur-
chased by them, would not have made the purchase nor 
would they have expended this substantial sum of money on 
a home thereon, and if such street be opened as contem-
plated by said city, such defendants would suffer greatly 
and irreparably. 
Without repeating all of the findings set out in the 
statement of facts, they clearly show an estoppel against 
the plaintiff. Municipal corporations may be estopped by 
their .acts, ·conduct or contracts in like manner and under 
like circumstances as in the case of an estoppel against in-
dividuals, as is stated in 21 ·C. J., 1160: 
"One who with knowledge of the facts and with-
out objection suffers another to make improvements 
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or expenditures on, or in connection with, his property, 
or in derogation of his rights under the claim of title, 
will be estopped to deny such title to the prejudice to 
that other \vho has acted in reliance on and been mis-
led by his conduct.'' 
Numerous authorities in support of the above propo-
sition are quoted from various states, including Utah. 
These are general rules applicable to individuals as well 
as cities. It would be a violent presumption to assume that 
the mayors or city councils of Pleasant Grove City would 
go on for seventy or eighty years without knowledge that 
the defendants and their predecessors in interest had been 
occupying and improving the property in dispute for that 
period and that it had been fenced and the public excluded 
therefrom, and that the taxes on said disputed property had 
been paid to the city for upwards of thirty-five years. To 
the contrary, it must be found that the mayors and city 
councils of Pleasant Grove City throughout the years were 
conversant with, and had knowledge of the conditions as 
set out herein and that they are precluded at this late date 
to deny the possession of such knowledge. We quote from 
City of Los Angeles v. Cohn, 35 Pac. 1003: 
"While municipal corporations do not own their 
public streets, and while the laches of municipal offi-
cers cannot defeat the rights of the public in those 
streets, yet individuals 1have some rights which, in the 
exercise of common justi-ce, the municipality must re-
spect.'' 
And quoting from Dillon, the said case continued: 
"It will, perhaps, be found that necessities some-
times arise, of such a character that justice requires 
that an equitable estoppel~shall be asserted, even against 
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the public; but if so, such cases will form a law unto 
themselves, and do not fall within the legal operation 
of limitation enactments." 
And, again from such text: 
''We think, therefore, that mere adverse posses .. 
sion, for the statutory period, of a street or alley in a 
town which is a publie highway, cannot confer a title, 
but where such possession is accompanied with other 
circumstances which would render it inequitable that 
the public should assert its rights to regain possession, 
then, upon the principle of estoppel, a party may be 
protected against the assertion of right by the public, 
in order to prevent manifest wrong and injustice." 
Another case referring to the facts necessary to estab-
lish estoppel: 
"Neither is it necessary to point to any special 
· word or act on the part of those now represented by 
appellant to justify an estoppel; for an estoppel will be 
created by silence, when it operates as a fraud, as ef-
fectually as by spoken word or overt act. Estoppel is 
a doctrine enforceable by the courts whenever the equi-
ties of the particular case demand it. SOmetimes it may 
be predicated upon word or action; sometimes upon the 
lack of. them; but, whatever its origin, it is invoked 
in the interest of equity and good conscience." Rog-
ers, et al v. Reynolds, 164 P·ac. 80, esp. 82. 
Cases without limit from different jurisdictions could be 
cited relating to estoppel, decided under different conditions 
and circumstances, but which would throw little light on 
cases under facts similar to the case now before the Court, 
and a review of these eases· might entail endless search and 
result in confusion rather than clarity. For that reason~ 
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we are ~ontent to cite a few authorities showing the general 
principle with respect to which there is little or no dispute, 
and then consider the cases in our own state which may aid 
the Court in arriving at a just conclusion and which an-
nounce the la\v of estoppel in this state. These cases are: 
Wall"v~ Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pac. 766; Tooele 
City v. Elkington, 100 Utah· 485, 116 P.2d 406; Hall v. Og-
den, 109 Utah 304, 166 P.2d 221; Premium Oil ·Company v. 
Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199. 
The plaintiff at the trial cited the Provo City ·case re-
ported in 156 Fed. 2d 710, which was heard on a writ of 
certiorari. The facts in the Provo case are quite dissimilar 
from the facts in this case, and throw no light upon the case 
of Pleasant .Grove. That very case, however, recognizes. the 
principle of the Wall case under different facts. The Provo 
case involved a street which had been actually in use up to 
recent times. 
The case of Wall v. Salt Lake City, supra, is a well 
considered case, and is about the first case decided by otiT 
Court having any particular bearing upon facts somewhat 
analogous to the facts in this case. It merits more than 
casual consideration and we will therefore discuss this case 
more or less in detail. 
. The plaintiff, Nellie M. Wall, brought the action against 
Salt Lake City to quiet title, for damages and for injunc-
tive relief. Salt Lake City contended that Eighth South 
Street in said city was one hundred thirty-two feet in width 
.·. - ' 
t~roughout its entire length; the plaintiff in the lower court 
and the respondent in the Supreme Court disputed that 
cl~ and contended that said Eighth South Street was but 
sixty-six feet wide from Tenth East to Thirteenth East 
Str~e.t and that th~ other sixty-six feet was her privat~ prop-
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er1y. In this discussion, we will hereafter designate Mrs. 
Wall as plaintiff and Salt Lake City as defendant: 
Plaintiff ·claimed the property in dispute as her private 
p~operty and she was in possession of the same, when the 
defendant, against her protest, entered upon the same and 
commenced to excavate the ground, preparatory to instal-
ling a sewer, upon the claim that said area was a part of 
a city street and therefore, both parties claimed title to the 
said property. Plaintiff claimed her title to the property 
through various conveyances made by her predecessors in 
interest who had occupied the premises both before and 
after the townsite entry was made in 1871. 
Such predecessors .in intere8t had occupied the prem-
ises in dispute, together with land adjoining the· same on 
the south as farm and pasture. 
The land was enclosed during a large portion of the 
time from sometime prior to 1871 until 1891, when plain .. 
tiff's grantors platted the same as a townsite under the 
name of Fremont Heights in which plat, Eighth South 
Street was only sixty-six feet wide. 
Up to 1891, th~re was no substantial evidence that the 
ground in dispute was used as a public street and was large-
ly unuseable for the purposes of a street, and that was sub-
stantially its condition when the same was platted by the 
plaintiff's. immediaate predecessor and wh~n it was pro-
cured to be adopted by the defendant in 1891. 
The defendant city based its right to the disputed area 
upon certai.n plats or diagrams found in the files of the City 
and County of Salt Lake, whi~ch, however, do not appear to 
be authenti~cated as official plats. One such plat, called 
"Plat F"_, was especially relied on by defendant because it 
was claimed that it covered the area in dispute and that it 
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\Vas recognized by the plaintiff and .her predecessors in in-
terest, with its lots, blocks and streets, as a plat of that por-
tion of the city, prior to the townsite entry and since, and 
that plaintiff \Vas bound thereby. 
Defendant, however, did not contend that the city 
opened or used the ground in question as a pubUc street 
prior to the adoption of the Fremont Heights Addition, ex-
cept by a general ordinance or resolution in 1887, author-
izing the opening of streets and removing obstructions there-
from. But, defendant city contends that the ground, being 
platted as a public street before the entry as a townsite in 
1871, it was unnecessary that the same be opened or used 
by- the public at the time in order to give the city title 
thereto. 
The defendant further contended that the action of the 
city in adopting the Fremont Heights plat where Eighth 
South was limited to sixty-six feet between Tenth and Thir-
teenth East Streets, and in recognizing the disputed strip as 
private land, was void, and being so considered by the city 
in 1912 when the defendant entered upon the same to con-
struct the sewer. The Supreme Court, however, brushed 
aside the claim above set out, in the following language: 
"These are the main contentions of the parties as 
to the basis of their respective claims of title. Minor 
consideration in support of, or against, these conten-
tions will be referred to, if material, later in the course 
of this opinion." 
The case was tried -by the court, judgment rendered 
for the plaintiff declaring her to be the owner of the prop-
erty, awarding her damages and injunctive relief. 
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Further quoting: 
"In view of the case, many of the questions argued 
at great length by counsel of the respective parties need 
not be eonsidered in detail, as the conclusion we have 
reached renders them immaterial and their considera-
tion wholly unnecessary. 
''Some of the questions thus presented are of great 
importance and whenever a case is presented in which 
they, or any of them, become turning points in the case 
they will then be of vital importance demands. 
"Whether or not the ground in dispute was a plat-
ted street at the time the townsite was entered and 
whether or not it was platted at that time and recog-
nized by persons conveying adjacent property, and 
whether or not occupants of the land, in presenting 
their claims to the probate court, by not claiming cer-
tain ground platted as streets, thereby abandoned any 
right they may have had or become barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, and whether or not the federal grant 
under which the townsite was entered should be con-
strued one way or the other, are questions which are 
not in the least degree controlling in view of the con-
clusions at which we have arrived. In our view, the 
one question in this case which overshadows all others, 
and to which this opinion should be mainly directed, is 
whether or not the defendant city is estopped by rea-
. son .of its own conduct from now claiming title to the 
property in question. This being the case, it is mani-
fest that any serious ~consideration given to the ques-
tions above referred to would be entirely unnecessary." 
The principle issue involved here is whether or not the 
plaintiff by its ·conduct should be held estopped to claim 
any right to the parcel of land in dispute and as to whether 
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or not such disputed area should be quieted in the defend-
ants. 
The facts are before the Court on the findings. The 
question on this branch of the case therefore is: Do such 
(acts justify the conclusion that the city is now estopped 
to claim any right to the property in question? Without 
repeating the facts, as heretofore set out, we may, however, 
call the attention of the Court to the fact that since 1916, 
the title to the property in dispute has been shown in the 
records of Utah County as being held in private ownership 
and the same has been mortgaged by the record owners 
from time to time to different parties in Pleasant Grove 
and elsewhere, and the title thereto has been conveyed by 
warranty and quit claim deeds to different parties, and said 
disputed area has been foreclosed at different times and 
title transferred by public officers after 'being advertised 
for tax sale, and disposed of at public auction and finally 
purchased by the defendants; and during all these periods 
and previous thereto, any inspection of the premises by 
mortgagees or purchasers would show the same as a part of 
the larger tracts, and the abstracts would show the record 
as conveyed by metes and bounds covering the disputed 
area, and said taX record would show that said property 
since 1916 to be taxed and the taxes collected and said par .. 
eels in all respects treated as private property. Any in-
spection by plaintiff's authorities, officers or any person 
either as to the county records or an inspection of the prem-
ises would show that said parcels of land were being held as 
private property and that defendants, in the view of the 
record, purchased the property and have made valua1ble im-
provements upon the same in good faith, and in reliance 
upon their title, without any act on the part of the city or 
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anyone else to indicate to them that the title was not as 
represented by their warranty deeds. Under that record 
and those conditions, it is rather astounding to find the city 
trying to deprive these people of their property without con-
demnation proceedings and attempting to remove the de-
fendants therefrom without any compensation. 
Judge Thurman, in writing the opinion on the Wall 
case, said: 
"By far the greater number of cases cited by re-
spondent, like those cited by appellant, relate only to· 
questions of adverse possession, pres·cription, statutes 
of limitation, and equitable estoppel by acquiescence 
on the part of the municipality that it should be es-
. topped, under the circumstances, from asserting that 
the ground is a public street. Very few of the cases 
·show that the municipality did any affirmative act or 
made any declarations, as a basis for the estoppel. In 
.other words, the majority of the cases eited by respond-
ent simply assert the contrary doctrine to that held by 
the cases cited by appellant under facts generally, if 
not entirely similar. Numberless cases on both sides 
of the question, in addition to those cited by appellant 
and respondent, could be referred to, reviewed, and 
criticized and only one conclusion would be finally 
reached and that is that in the character of cases cited 
the decision appear to be in hopeless conflict." 
In many respects, this case is a much stronger case 
than the Wall case supporting the theory of estoppel· against 
municipalities and as the authorities. cited by Judge Thur-
man in his opinion are also persuasive in favor of defend-
ants' contention here, we 'o/fll take the liberty of further 
quoting from said case, which refers to a Wisconsin case 
reported in 68 NW on page 957. In concluding its opinion, 
the Wisconsin court said: 
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"The adoption of the second plat by the act incor .. 
porating the city of Kaukauna in 1885, the requirement 
made by such city of Law to build a sidewalk along 
the side of the park, the construction of such sidewalk, 
the payment of taxes assessed annually on the prop.. 
erty for a long period of years, and the improvement 
of the property at considerable expense, relying upon 
the long-continued recognition of private ownership by 
the municipality, in which all persons interested, so 
far as appears, acquiesced, with all the other facts and 
circumstances, show satisfactorily that, if a change 
of position on the part of the public now be allowed, 
such injustice and wrong will result as to warrant the 
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais 
· to prevent such injustice." 
In the course of the opinion, Judge Thurman referred 
to the good faith of the plaintiff in the Wall case and showed 
that the plaintiff improved the property purchased on the 
faith of a good and sufficient title to the ground. He then 
observed: 
"After 20 years from the time the Fremont Heights 
addition was approved and after all of these equities 
had intervened, the defendant comes upon the scene, 
and with no other excuse than that it had made a mis-
take twenty-one years before, it commenced to tear 
up the ground, and by force· and arms exercise a 
dominion over this property. Recognized it not only 
by the plat it approved but by assessing it and enrich-
ing its own coffers by tribute exacted in the form of 
taxes. We believe as was said by the court in City of 
Sullivan v. Tichenor, supra, cited by appellant that: 
'A municipal corporation can no more profit by fraud 
upon property owners than an individual and may be 
estopped by conduct.''' 
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And then quoting from Judge Dillon, Justice Thunnan 
continues . quoting: 
''The principle of estoppel in pais has been applied 
to exceptional cases where the elements calling for its 
exercise appear to have been an abandonment of the 
public use for the pres·criptive period, inclosure and ex-
pensive improvements, such as large and costly build-
ings, or acts of the municipality inducing the abutter 
to believe that there is no longer any street, and the 
expenditure of money in reliance upon the acts of the 
municipality. The absolute bona fides of the abutter 
or adverse possessor is a most important factor where 
an estoppel in pais is claimed. The acts relied on must 
be of such character as to amount to a fraud, if the 
city were permitted to claim otherwise." 
And we think it pertinent at this point to call attention 
to what Judge Thurman further said with reference to the 
facts in the Wall case and ·that municipalities may be es-
topped by_ permitting the expenditure of large sums of 
money in buildings and the like upon public streets without 
objections. Then he observes: 
''We confess that we are unable to see any differ-
ence in ·principle between a person who, under the cir-
cumstances, spends his money in the erection of a build-
ing and one who expends his money upon the same 
assurance for the purchase of land whi~ch is subject to 
controversy. The loss to a party of his improvements 
of the value of $3,000 or more is no greater injury to 
the person injured than the loss of any other invest-
ment of the same amount." 
The case of Tooele City v. Elkington, supra, is veey 
dissimilar to the Pleasant Grove case now before the Court. 
No improvements were made upon the property involved. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
No taxes \Vere assessed or paid upon the property, and while 
the city executed a deed to the property at Elkington, prac-
tically without consideration, the said deed was executed 
without authority under the statute which provided: 
"No person shall be allowed to acquire any right 
or title in or to any lands held by any town or city, or 
the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public 
use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks, public 
squares, or for other purposes by adverse possession 
thereof for any length of time whatsoever." 
This law was not enacted until 1899. Judge Moffitt 
in the Tooele case ·cited the Wall case with approval, and 
holds that the Tooele case is not in any way in conflict with 
the Wall case. 
Another case referred to above, Premium ·Oil Company, 
also cites with approval the Wall case, including the cita-
tions made by Judge Dillon, which Cedar City case is in no 
way in conflict with the Wall case nor with the authorities 
therein cited, and it further upholds and confirms the equi-
table doctrine that municipalities as well as individuals 
may be estopped from repossessing property under condi-
tions set out in the Wall case and other cases of like char~ 
acter. See McMullin on Municipal Corporations, revised 
second edition, Vol. 4, p. 815; Cedar ·City case. supra. 
The principle of estoppel is controlling whether adverse 
possession is, or is not, present. As far as the case of Hall 
v. North Ogden City and the Provo City case are concerned, 
neither of those ·cases in any way is inconsistent with the 
Wall ease or the authorities hereinabove referred to. We 
therefore deem is unnecessary to review them in detail. 
In the Hall case, neither was estoppel relied upon or pleaded; 
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alverse possession alone being relied upon under facts dif-
rer~nt than here involved. 
Adverse possession was pleaded upon the peculiar facts 
in. this case, but estoppel may be shown in evidence even 
though adverse possession may or may not be a valid claim. 
While we do not admit that the defense of adverse posses-
sion is not meritorious, we believe that the estoppel which 
the facts raise against the city removes any question either 
with, or independent of, technical, adverse possession. 
Judge Thurman in the Wall case posed the question of 
adverse possession but declined to make any ruling with 
respect thereto on the ground that the Wall case was clearly 
a case that should be decided upon the principle of estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
Since it is undisputed that the defendants are now in 
possession and have been in the possession of the property 
in question for more than eighty years, they at least have 
a better right than plaintiff, which has been determined to 
have no right, title, interests or possession at all, and there-
fore defendants' titles should be quieted as against the plain-
tiff. Moreover, the facts show in effect that defendants 
actually have legal title, they and their predecessors hav-
ing been in adverse possession of the property from a time 
prior to the original townsite entry in 1869. 
Finally, and even more conclusively, as· has been re-
peatedly indicated by this Court, cities may be estopped by 
conduct over a long period of time from asserting titles as 
against citizens, the facts found by the lower court convinc .. 
ingly establish such estoppel. In fact, it would be difficult 
to imagine a case whi·ch more clearly gives right to an es-
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toppel from every standpoint of equity, justice and fair deal-
ing. From these standpoints, and pursuant to the estab-
lished law of this state, that portion of the lower cowt's 
ju.dgment denying relief to defendants should be reversed 
and the entry of judgment should be entered by this Court, . 
quieting defendants' respective titles to the land in contra-. 
versy as against the plaintiff, and awarding defendants their 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
For Christenson & Christenson 
Attorneys for Appellants 
First Security Bank Building 
Provo, Utah 
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